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Abstract
Dental service providers in the British National Health Service (NHS) operate under
a number of remuneration arrangements that give rise to different incentives. We
present a theoretical model of the effect of different remuneration structures on treat-
ment intensity and test this model on data on treatments carried out in Scotland.
After controlling for differences in patient need and dentist specific preferences, we
find that self-employed dentists treat patients who are exempt from payment more
intensively than their employed counterparts. The results imply that changes in re-
muneration can have a large effect on the distribution of treatments. More generally
our results provide support for economic models that view financial incentives as
important determinants of physician behaviour.
JEL classification: I11
Keywords: health services, British NHS, physician agency, treatment intensity,
financial incentives.
1 Introduction
A recurring concern in the health care literature is the discretion that providers of
health care have over the extent of treatment offered, inputs that affect cost, quality
and the price of health care and the extent to which this discretion is exercised in
ways that may be against the interests of the recipients of health services or private or
public purchasing agencies. McGuire (2000) refers to these related issues as “Physi-
cian Agency”. When prices are administered, and therefore set outside of the control
of physicians, and quality issues are not paramount, physician agency problems per-
sist if the quantity of services delivered differs from that which the patient, or a third
party payer — such as an insurance company — would wish to have delivered. If the
payer could observe the precise medical condition of a patient and could monitor the
treatment carried out, then it would simply be necessary to specify which treatments
will be paid for, for which types of patients. In practice, however, it is not possible
to specify and monitor the precise medical condition of patients and, thus, providers
retain considerable discretion in how they treat individual patients — a given course of
treatment can then be justified on the grounds that the patient’s particular circum-
stances warranted it. By making treatments more or less remunerative or by choosing
to retain physicians on fixed wage contracts, purchasers may seek to align physician
actions with their desired outcomes. Whilst, such instruments can be expected, in
a wide variety of circumstances, to affect the prevalence of treatments their impact
in practice may be limited by the extent to which medical ethics or other objectives
being pursued by physicians offset the impact of financial rewards. Hence, the ef-
fectiveness of provider remuneration in influencing outcomes is an empirical question
and it is towards resolving that question that this paper is directed.
The absence of natural experiments in which remuneration methods are contem-
poraneously varied across physicians and the difficulty of controlling for the variation
of patients received by individual physicians or idiosyncratic preferences on the part
of those physicians all represent considerable obstacles to the empirical resolution of
this issue. Our data allow us to address these obstacles.
Dentists in the British National Health Service (NHS) work under a variety of
remuneration systems that imply differences in the effective price received for dif-
fering treatment courses delivered. In part these differences reflect decisions made
by the (government) purchaser, which both contracts with independent practitioners
and allows for direct employment of practitioners, and in part they derive from the
working arrangements of dentists. Young dentists starting out in practice typically
enter into a revenue sharing arrangement with other dentists who are owners of their
practices. These revenue sharing arrangements imply that dentists within the same
practice may face quite different effective prices for delivering treatments. The ex-
istence of a single, integrated payments system recording details of payments and
maintaining details of the dentists claiming payments and of the patients that they
treat, provides an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of different remuneration
methods in controlling quantity setting by physician ‘agents’.
Our approach is to set out a theoretical framework for analysing the effect of
remuneration systems upon the treatment decisions of dentists and to assess that
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framework in the light of data generated by the dental remuneration system in Scot-
land. Consistent with practice, our theoretical framework allows for a distinction
between patients who bear the full cost of their treatment and patients who are insu-
lated from these costs, who we term exempt. We summarise the dentist’s decision in
the form of a single outcome which we term treatment intensity, that has an observ-
able analogue — the value of the treatments given. Within the theoretical framework
we find that there are grounds for expecting that self-employed dentists will engage
in more intensive treatment of patients, particularly when those patients are exempt
from payment, and thus immune from the financial implications of that treatment.
Subjecting 14053 observed courses of treatment to analysis in the context of our
model we find that there are significant and large differences between the treatments
delivered according to the dentist’s remuneration method. Controlling for both vari-
ations between patients and dentist specific variations, we find that self-employed
dentists treat exempt patients more intensively. Furthermore, from within the pop-
ulation of self-employed dentists, it is those who are owners of practices that treat
exempt patients the most intensively. Hence, we show that otherwise similar patients
receive different treatment according the remuneration structure under which their
dentist receives payment.
The theoretical literature that forms the starting point for this paper is that
concerning third party purchasing for health services and incentives — Chalkley and
Malcomson (2000) and McGuire (2000) provide surveys of this literature. This litera-
ture considers how third party payers who are in a position to incorporate incentives
into their purchasing arrangements optimally choose those incentives. The emphasis
in this literature has been upon cost-quality trade-offs. Our approach is to examine
how existing simple remuneration systems will impact on the choice of treatment
quantity subject to asymmetric information regarding the characteristics of patients
of the type considered by Chalkley and Malcomson (2002). A number of empirical
studies have considered how purchasing arrangements affect treatment decisions in
practice. The transition from cost-reimbursement to prospective payment in the US
Medicare system provided data relevant to this approach and that data has been
extensively analysed — see for example Ellis and McGuire (1996) who specifically
consider issues arising out of selection effects. Our own empirical strategy with re-
gard to these issues is set out in the labour economics literature — see Rosen and
Willis (1979) and Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2000) — and follows the tradition
of Lazear (2000) in seeking to quantify incentive effects. The data considered here is,
we believe, unique in allowing for comparison of remuneration methods across health
care practitioners at a given point in time whilst also permitting controls for patient
variation and provider selection.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section is concerned with describing
some relevant features of the provision of dental services in the British NHS. Section
3 develops the theoretical model and analyses the decisions made by a dentist under
a variety of remuneration methods. Section 4 describes our data, sets out our empir-
ical methodology and presents the empirical results. Section 5 contains concluding
remarks.
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2 Dentistry in the British NHS
The majority of National Health Service (NHS) primary care dental services1 in
Britain are provided by what is termed the General Dental Service (GDS). The
details of the institutions that we report here relate to the NHS in Scotland but the
organisational structure, remuneration methods and remuneration rates apply equally
to the NHS in England and Wales.
An individual requiring treatment under the NHS visits a dentist, who is under
an agreement with the GDS to provide NHS treatments, and registers with them for
treatment. The costs of treatment are met in part by Health Boards which receive
government funds in order to meet the dental and medical health care needs of their
constituent populations. Unlike other health services supplied by the NHS there is a
substantial element of patient cost sharing in dentistry. Unless exempt from charges,
which can occur for a number of reasons, the patient pays 80% of the ‘cost’ of their
treatment up to a cash limit2. Approximately 80% of qualified dentists work as
primary care General Dental Practitioners (GDPs) in the GDS. These dentists and
the treatments that they carry out are the focus of this paper.
GDPs are predominantly self-employed and may work both privately and for the
NHS. For NHS work a GDP’s remuneration contract specifies both a fee for each
treatment administered and a capitation payment for each patient registered. Treat-
ments delivered to a particular patient over a single course of treatment are gathered
together into a single claim. Hence, a claim is comprised of a number of items of
treatment, each of which has a fixed price, delivered to a particular patient cover-
ing a treatment episode. Historically fees for each treatment were set so as to be a
fair recompense for the time and other inputs required to carry out that treatment.
Over time technical progress and productivity changes lead to individual treatment
fees becoming distorted relative to their original values. For a time there was active
review of treatment fees with a view to restoring parity to time and cost but the last
major review was in 1996 since when fees have been allowed to vary in ‘real’ terms
simply being re-based in relation to general prices.
Within self-employed dentists there is a distinction between practice owners, who
are referred to as principals and the tenants of a practice — termed associates. Asso-
ciates practice dentistry in the premises of principals and have a relationship that is
governed be an Associateship Agreement. In principle this agreement could take any
form that the parties agree to but in practice almost all agreements follow guidelines
formulated by the dentists’ professional association. In essence, in return for the use
of premises and other services associated with it, the associate pays over a proportion
of his or her fees to the principal. Hence, associates are insulated by the principal
1Another element of provision are dental hospitals — a part of the NHS Hospital Dental Service
(HDS) — who treat patients referred to them from primary care dentists and carry out surgical
procedures or specialist orthodontic procedures.
2As an alternative to this conventional route for treatment, patients may opt to be treated
privately or to seek treatment by visiting a clinic run through the NHS Community Dental Service.
The CDS is a specialist ‘safety-net’ service designed to provide treatment for those patients who
may have difficulty in obtaining treatment directly from a dentist (perhaps because there are no
dentists under agreement with GDS in their area), or who would not otherwise seek treatment.
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from some costs of the treatments they carry out but in return share their revenues
with the principal.
Employed (salaried) GDPs are a relatively recent development and were instituted
in order to address a number of perceived deficiencies in dental service provision. A
workforce planning document, Sco (2000), reports that health boards may choose to
create salaried posts if GDPs in their locality are not accepting NHS registrations
or if GDPs are only accepting for treatment those patients exempt from payment or
entitled to remission or if there are no GDPs practising in an area. An employed
GDP works for a fixed salary and does not receive remuneration proportional to the
number or types of treatments she carries out. Importantly for our study, employed
GDPs record a claim in the same way as self employed GDPs by detailing the precise
treatments undertaken. These ‘shadow’ claims do not give rise to any payment but
are recorded alongside fee generating claims. Thus, it is possible to compare and
contrast the claims made by employed dentists with those of self-employed principals
and/or associates.
3 Theoretical Framework
We consider a supplier of dental services, henceforth dentist, who is remunerated
by a single purchaser for delivering treatment to a population of n patients with a
specific dental condition3 over a specified duration of time. Patients can fall into
one of two payment categories; exempt patients face no out-of-pocket expenditure
for the dental treatment they receive and constitute a fixed proportion ρE of all
patients; non-exempt patients pay a proportion of the cost of their treatment as
determined by the purchaser and are a proportion (1−ρE) of all patients. We assume
that the dentist receives a benefit b(t) from delivering a treatment of intensity t to
both sorts of patients and that the benefit function is differentiable and increasing
in t. The cost of treating a patient is assumed to be independent of the patient’s
payment status and has two components. The first, which we denote by c(t), is the
monetary cost of treatment, which includes laboratory fees and materials such as
amalgam or anaesthetics. The function c(t) is increasing, differentiable and convex.
The second element of cost is the dentist’s time, the monetary value of which we
denote τ (t)w(φ), where the function τ(.) is differentiable, increasing and convex and
reflects the time input, in hours, required to deliver treatment of intensity t and
w(φ) which is increasing and differentiable in φ, is the opportunity cost of time to
the dentist. The parameter φ ∈ [φ, φ] allows for variation between dentists in terms
of the value of their time and we assume that φ is a drawing from a distribution
g(φ).We normalize such that t = 0 constitutes the minimum treatment that can be
carried out and assume that the upper bound on treatment is determined by the
patient’s payment category. We assume that exempt patients, who are insulated
from the monetary cost of the treatment they receive, will accept any treatment they
are offered whilst non-exempt patients, because they face a proportion of the cost
3The generalization of this model to a setting where there is a continuum of dental conditions
and thus a corresponding distribution of patient types is detailed in Chalkley and Tilley (2002).
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of treatment, will not accept4 treatment in excess of tN . Finally, we assume that a
dentist has a maximum of T hours available to carry out treatments.
3.1 Dentists’ Decisions
The self-employed principal receives reimbursement from the purchaser in the form
of a (non-decreasing) payment function p(t) that specifies payment for each patient
conditional upon the treatment intensity claimed to have been given to that patient.
Auditing and verification procedures in the NHS ensure that any treatment intensity
claimed is actually delivered. A principal must meet the monetary costs of treatment
out of this payment and can retain any residual. In order to ensure that a patient
is treated p(t) must also satisfy p(t) + b(t) − c(t) − w(φ)τ(t) > 0, for some t. The
principal’s expected welfare, conditional upon assigning a treatment intensity of tSE
to exempt and tSN to non-exempt patients, is
W S = n
£
b(tSE)− c(tSE)− w(φ)τ(tSE) + p(tSE)
¤
ρE + (1)
n
£
b(tSN)− c(tSN )− w(φ)τ (tSN) + p(tSN )
¤
(1− ρE).
In choosing treatment intensities, the principal will maximise (1) subject to the con-
straints that treatment intensities are non-negative, that the treatment given to non-
exempt patients is less than tN and an overall time constraint,
T ≥ n £ρEτ(tSE) + (1− ρE)τ (tSN)¤ . (2)
Henceforth, we assume that the non-negativity constraints are satisfied. Thus, pro-
vided that the payment function p(.) is such that b(t) − c(t) − w(φ)τ (t) + p(t) is
concave in t, the principal chooses treatment intensities tSE and t
S
N to satisfy
ρEn
£
bt(t
S
E)− ct(tSE)− (w(φ) + λS)τ t(tSE) + pt(tSE)
¤
= 0 (3)
(1− ρE)n
£
bt(t
S
N)− ct(tSN)− (w(φ) + λS)τ t(tSN) + pt(tSN)
¤
+ λSN ≤ 0
tSN ≤ tN
¾
(4)
n
£
ρEτ t(t
S
E) + (1− ρE)τ t(tSN)
¤ ≤ T
λS ≥ 0
¾
(5)
where λS is the multiplier associated with constraint (2), λSN is the multiplier asso-
ciated with the upper treatment constraint on non-exempt patients and a right hand
brace indicates a pair of complementary inequalities, one of which must hold with
equality.
An associate dentist is not a part owner of the practice but enters into an income
sharing arrangement with a principal. The associate receives the same payment p(t)
as the principal but pays over a fraction (1−α) to the principal as recompense for the
monetary costs associated with treatments carried out in the dental practice. The
4The results of our analysis are preserved if it is possible for a dentist to exert an effort to
persuade a patient to accept more treatment but this effort is costly.
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welfare to the associate from this arrangement conditional upon assigning treatment
intensities of tAE, t
A
N to exempt and non-exempt patients is, therefore,
WA = n
£
b(tAE)− w(φ)τ (tAE) + αp(tAE)
¤
ρE + (6)
n
£
b(tAN)− w(φ)τ(tAN) + αp(tAN)
¤
(1− ρE).
The constraints to be satisfied in choosing treatment intensities are the same as those
described for the principal and, therefore, the associate chooses treatment intensities
tAE, t
A
N to satisfy
ρEn
£
bt(t
A
E)− (w(φ) + λA)τ t(tAE) + αpt(tAE)
¤
= 0 (7)
(1− ρE)n
£
bt(t
A
N )− (w(φ) + λA)τ t(tAN ) + αpt(tAN)
¤
+ λAN ≤ 0
tAN ≤ tN
¾
(8)
n
£
ρEτ t(t
A
E) + (1− ρE)τ t(tAN)
¤ ≤ T
λA ≥ 0
¾
(9)
An employed dentist receives a fixed wage W over the specified duration. There
are no costs incurred other than the costs of time. The welfare to the associate from
this arrangement conditional upon assigning treatment intensities of tEE, t
E
N to exempt
and non-exempt patients is, therefore,
WE = n
£
b(tEE)− w(φ)τ(tEE)
¤
ρE + n
£
b(tEN)− w(φ)τ(tEN )
¤
(1− ρE) +W. (10)
The constraints to be satisfied in choosing treatment intensities are the same as
those described for the principal (and associate) and, therefore, the employed dentist
chooses treatment intensities tEE, t
E
N to satisfy
ρEn
£
bt(t
E
E)− (w(φ) + λE)τ t(tEE)
¤
= 0 (11)
(1− ρE)n
£
bt(t
E
N)− (w(φ) + λE)τ t(tEN)
¤
+ λEN ≤ 0
tEN ≤ tN
¾
(12)
n
£
ρEτ t(t
E
E) + (1− ρE)τ t(tEN)
¤ ≤ T
λE ≥ 0
¾
(13)
3.2 Comparison of treatment intensities
Any two dentists will have different observed treatment intensities according to their
valuation of time as measured through w(φ), the number of patients they have to
treat and their remuneration. In our empirical study we control for variations be-
tween dentists using a fixed effects framework and thus we focus here on the roles of
remuneration method and numbers of patients treated.
We consider first the effect of remuneration conditional upon n being sufficiently
small and tN being sufficiently large such that neither of the associated constraints
bind on any dentist. In this case the impact of remuneration upon treatment in-
tensities can be deduced from (3), (4), (7), (8), (11) and (12), setting all Lagrange
multipliers to zero. The following proposition summarises the main results.
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Proposition 1 When neither time constraint nor treatment constraints bind then
given any remuneration contract, (1) a dentist will choose the same treatment inten-
sities for their exempt and their non-exempt patients, however, (2) a self-employed
associate will treat both exempt and non-exempt patients more intensively than an
employed dentist and (3) a self-employed principal will treat patients more intensively
than an employed dentist provided that pt − ct > 0. Hence, tAE = tAN > tEE = tEN and
if pt − ct > 0 then tSE = tSN > tEE = tEN .
Proof. If λS = λSN = 0 then condition (3) is equivalent to (4) and the choice of
treatment intensity for non-exempt patients is the same as the choice of treatment
intensity for exempt patients. Similarly for the coices of associate and employed
dentists when λA = λAN = 0 and λ
E = λEN = 0 respectively, thus establishing 1.
Setting λAN = λ
E
N = 0 and comparing (8) with (12) it follows that t
A
N > t
E
N . Combining
this observation with the already established claim 1. establishes claim 2. Finally,
setting λAN = λ
E
N = 0, assuming that pt − ct > 0 and comparing (4) with (12) it
follows that tSN > t
E
N . Combining this observation with the already established claim
1. establishes claim 3.
The benchmark case of non-binding constraints establishes that dentists who are
remunerated in relation to the treatment that they carry out (self- employed prin-
cipals and associates) will engage in more intensive treatment. The requirement for
the marginal price of treatment to exceed the marginal monetary cost of treatment
(pt − ct > 0) is one we expect to be satisfied in practice because, as discussed in sec-
tion 2 above, treatment prices in the NHS are set so as to cover both the monetary
and time costs of treatment. Provided this condition is satisfied, there is a close anal-
ogy between principal and associate dentists in terms of the theory of incentives —
both are remunerated over and above their respective altruistic benefit b(.) for more
intensive treatments. Henceforth, in this section we assume that pt − ct > 0 and
simply refer to self-employed dentists in place of the associate and principal. Whilst
qualitatively the two forms of self-employed remuneration are similar, there is the
possibility that they will lead to different treatment intensities – a possibility that
we allow for in the empirical analysis that follows.
Proposition 1 establishes a reference point which suggests that exempt and non-
exempt patients will be treated equally within a remuneration structure but differ-
entially across remuneration structures. However, constraints will in practice bind
for at least some types of dentist. In particular, since more intensive treatments are
costly in terms of time, it is more likely that a self-employed dentist will be time
constrained. Furthermore, since a self-employed dentist will wish to increase treat-
ment intensity, they are more likely to encounter resistance from patients, captured
in the model by the possibility of a binding treatment constraint. In either case cor-
responding Lagrange multipliers are non-zero and the claimed relationship between
treatment intensities can fail. However, in both cases it is self-employed dentists
who, on account of their desire to increase treatment intensity, will first encounter a
binding constraint. We therefore consider next the case of a time constraint binding
on self-employed dentists.
Proposition 2 When the treatment constraint does not bind and the time constraint
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binds on only self-employed dentists then both employed and self-employed dentists
will choose the same treatment intensities for exempt and non-exempt patients and
a self-employed dentist will treat patients more intensively than an employed dentist
Hence, tAE = t
A
N > t
E
E = t
E
N and t
S
E = t
S
N > t
E
E = t
E
N .
Proof. According to the conditions of the proposition, λSN = λ
A
N = λ
E
N = λ
E = 0
and λS, λA > 0 and the demonstration of the proposition follows that for Proposition
1.
Whilst the existence of a time constraint reduces the treatment intensities offered
by self-employed dentists it does not impact upon the relative treatment offered to
exempt and non-exempt patients. However, when the treatment constraint binds on
a self-employed dentist it impacts on the treatment that can be administered to non-
exempt patients — exempt patients who are insulated from the cost of their treatment
will be more accepting of more intensive treatment. Thus, in the case of a binding
treatment constraint there is a rationale for a self-employed dentist to treat exempt
and non-exempt patients differently. The following proposition provides the details.
Proposition 3 When the time constraint does not bind and the treatment constraint
binds on only self-employed dentists, then self employed dentists will treat exempt
patients more intensively than non-exempt patients whilst employed dentists will treat
exempt and non-exempt patients with equal intensity. Hence, tAE > t
A
N > t
E
E = t
E
N and
tSE > t
S
N > t
E
E = t
E
N .
Proof. Under the conditions stated in the proposition λS = λA = λE = λEN = 0
and 0 < λAN , λ
S
N . It follows from comparing condition (3) with (4) and (7) with
(8) that both kinds of self-employed dentists will set higher treatment intensities
for exempt patients. The comparison of (11) with (12) confirms that the employed
dentist will treat exempt and non-exempt patients equally (as in Proposition 1).
Furthermore, as in Proposition 1 inspection of the first order conditions (3),(7) and
(11) establishes that a self-employed dentist will engage in more intensive treatments
than their employed counterparts.
Proposition 3 provides insight into why treatment intensities to exempt and non-
exempt patients might vary according to a dentist’s remuneration. If a dentist has
a financial interest in increasing the intensity of treatment, and if such an increase
is easier to effect on some patients than on others, then otherwise identical patients
may receive differing treatment. Since in our framework it is self-employed dentists
that have a financial interest in treatment intensity, it is these dentists that we should
expect to see offering different treatment intensities across exempt and non-exempt
patients. Employed dentists have no incentive to discriminate in this way. According
to Proposition 3 a self-employed dentist will continue to treat both exempt and non-
exempt patients more intensively than their employed counterpart. However, when
both the time constraint and the treatment constraint bind on a self-employed dentist
the incentive to increase treatment intensity on those patients for whom such an
increase is possible can result in a reduction of treatment intensity for other patients.
The following proposition provides the details.
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Proposition 4 When both the time constraint and the treatment constraint bind on
only self-employed dentists, then, 1. self-employed dentists will treat exempt patients
more intensively than non-exempt patients whilst employed dentists will treat exempt
and non-exempt patients with equal intensity and 2. self-employed dentists will treat
exempt patients more intensively than employed dentists but may treat non-exempt
patients less intensively than employed dentists. Hence, tAE > t
E
E = t
E
N S tAN and
tSE > t
E
E = t
E
N S tSN .
Proof. Under the conditions stated in the proposition λE = λEN = 0 and 0 <
λAN , λ
S
N , λ
S, λA. It follows from comparing condition (3) with (4) and (7) with (8) that
both kinds of self-employed dentists will set higher treatment intensities for exempt
patients. The comparison of (11) with (12) confirms that the employed dentist will
treat exempt and non-exempt patients equally. Inspection of the first order conditions
(4),(8) and (12) given that λA, λS > λE = 0 admits the possibility that an employed
dentist will engage in more intensive treatments of non-exempt patients than their
self-employed counterparts.
Finally in this section, we address the issue of the tightening of a dentist’s time
constraint. Whilst the time that a dentist has available is not something we expect to
observe variations in, different dentists face varying patient caseloads. An increasing
caseload implies that the time available to treat any one patient is reduced, with con-
sequences for the treatment intensity that can be delivered. The following proposition
provides details of this.
Proposition 5 If the time constraint is strictly binding for both self-employed and
employed dentists and the treatment constraint is not binding on any dentist then
dtS
E
dn
,
dtS
N
dn
< 0,
dtA
E
dn
,
dtA
N
dn
< 0 and dt
E
E
dn
,
dtE
N
dn
< 0. If the time constraint is not binding for
either self-employed or employed dentists and the treatment constraint is binding on
only self-employed dentists then dt
S
E
dn
= 0,
dtS
N
dn
< 0,
dtA
E
dn
= 0,
dtA
N
dn
< 0 and dt
E
E
dn
=
dtE
N
dn
= 0.
Proof. By inspection of conditions (3), (4),(7) ,(11) and (12) the respective treat-
ment intensities are decreasing in n and λS, λA and λE respectively, thus establishing
the first part of the claim claim. Under the conditions of the second part of the
claim, λA = λS = λE = 0 and λSN , λ
A
N > 0. Inspection of conditions (3),(establishes
these are independent of n whilst conditions (4) and (7) indicate that the assoicated
treatment intensities are decreasing in n.
Together Propositions 1 to 5 provide testable hypotheses for our empirical analysis.
In summary these are: self-employed dentists should treat at least some patients more
intensively than their employed counterparts; only self-employed dentists should be
observed to treat otherwise similar exempt and non-exempt patients with different
treatment intensities; when a self-employed dentist treats otherwise similar exempt
and non-exempt patients differently, it is exempt patients who should be treated more
intensively; all dentists should exhibit treatment intensities that are non-increasing
in the number of patients treated.
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4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Data
The details of all NHS dental treatment in Scotland are collected by the Management
Information and Dental Accounting System (MIDAS) which is an administrative
database primarily used for paying dentists. MIDAS covers all NHS courses of dental
treatment delivered and paid for over the last 10 years — in 2000-2001 approximately
4.1 million courses of NHS dental treatment were provided. Each practice, dentist,
patient, course of treatment and individual treatment is allocated a unique identifier
and it is, therefore, possible to follow patients, dentists and types of treatment over
time. For the purposes of our analysis we obtained a simple random sample from
the MIDAS database. Specifically, our data is for the claims made in 2000-2001 for
patients whose identification number ended in the digits 001 for self-employed dentists
and 001, 002 or 003 for employed dentists.
When faced with a patient, a dentist designs a treatment plan detailing the treat-
ment required to address that patient’s specific dental condition. Within MIDAS
this treatment plan is termed a claim. Within each claim the patient may receive
a number of specific treatments: an examination, a scale and polish, a radiograph,
an extraction etc. Each of these claim treatments has a specific code (and fee) as-
sociated with it. These fees are determined annually in a bilateral bargain between
dentists’ representatives and health boards and the menu of fees is set out in an an-
nual publication termed the Statement of Dental Remuneration (SDR). Whilst the
level of fees has increased over time, the relative fees for treatments have remained
fixed and based on the initial timings referred to in Section 2. Hence, the total value
of a claim is the empirical analogue of p(t) and provides an indication of the time
that the dentist has spent treating a patient. Henceforth, we use the log of the real
fee claimed5 to measure the intensity of treatment t.
Our data set contains 14053 usable claims and we further restrict the sample to
include only those courses of treatment that require some active intervention by a
dentist (approximately 75% of the full sample). This involves removing claims where
the only treatments are, either alone or in conjunction, a dental examination and a
scale and polish. These limited treatments are only provided when the patient is in a
good state of dental health and requires no active treatment6. Following removal of
these claims, there are 821, 1769 and 7299, active claims for treatment provided by
employed, associate and principal dentists respectively. These relativities accord well
with the reported data on the proportion of associate, principal and employed GDPs
in Scotland (Dental Business Trends Survey, 2000). Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics of these data.
The variables in Table 1 can be related to the theoretical model of Section 3 di-
rectly or indirectly. The variable clpery is the empirical counterpart of n, the number
of claims per time period. The number of of claims per dentists is much larger for em-
5Adjusted to prices in 1999-2000
6In subsequent empirical analyses we intend to model these minimum treatment cliams more
formally.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics by contract
Variable Description Principal Associate Employed
n Total number of claims 7299 1769 821
lrf The log of the real fee per claim 3.43 3.37 3.43
clpery The number of claims per dentist
per year
4.09 3.53 5.79
ddiag Equals 1 if at least one treatment
on the claim was a diagnosis item
0.62 0.59 0.67
dprev Equals 1 if at least one treat-
ment on the claim was a preven-
tive item
0.0001 0.003 0
dperio Equals 1 if at least one treatment
on the claim was a periodontal
item
0.40 0.35 0.35
dcons Equals 1 if at least one treatment
on the claim was a conservative
item
0.63 0.61 0.55
dsurg Equals 1 if at least one treatment
on the claim was a surgical item
0.15 0.15 0.23
dprosth Equals 1 if at least one treat-
ment on the claim was a pros-
thetic item
0.12 0.11 0.13
dorth Equals 1 if at least one treatment
on the claim was an orthodontic
item
0.03 0.02 0
dother Equals 1 if at least one treatment
on the claim was an ‘other’ item
0.16 0.19 0.19
page The age of the patient 37.68 36.10 39.44
dpsex The sex of the patient 0.44 0.49 0.47
depcat The deprivation category of the
dentist’s practice
3.99 3.79 3.90
exempt A dummy varible equal to 1 if the
patient is exempt
0.37 0.35 0.34
Note: The ‘other’ claim s constitute m iscellaneous treatm ents not categorised e lsewhere.
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ployed dentists than self-employed dentists because — given that employed dentists are
approximately 2% of the Scottish dental workforce — we sampled more patients from
employed dentists. Whilst our theoretical model considered a single type of dental
condition, it is straightforward to generalise it to a multiple or a continuum of dental
conditions. The dummy variables ddiag, dprev, dperio, dcons, dsurg, dprosth, dorth
and dother are based on the broad treatment categories defined in the SDR and thus
identify different types of dental condition. For example, dcons is a dummy vari-
able which equals 1 if the patient received any type of conservative treatment and
0 otherwise. Table 1 indicates that employed dentists provide more surgical treat-
ment and less conservative treatment than their self-employed counterparts. Besides
dental specific characteristics, we use standard patient characteristics (age, sex and
the socioeconomic indicator depcat) as further proxies for different types of patients.
Finally, the exemption status of the patient exempt indicates whether a patient is
insulated from charges and is the exact analogue of the exempt category of patients
discussed in section 3. Approximately 65% of claims in the sample were made in
respect of patients who were liable for the full NHS patient charge which constitutes
80% of the NHS treatment fee. Patients may be exempt from payment of NHS dental
charges for a number of reasons depending upon their individual circumstances in-
cluding age, employment/income status or general health (e.g. pregnant and nursing
mothers are exempt).
4.2 Regression results
Our objective is to determine the impact of remuneration on treatment decisions
but as the theoretical model makes clear treatment decisions are a consequence of
both the remuneration method and unobservable variations (φ) between dentists.
Furthermore, dentists may choose the form of remuneration that is most advantageous
to them and thus the observed treatment intensities will exhibit selection bias. To
deal with these issues we adopt a fixed effects framework and estimate the fixed-effects
regressions,
ln ykij = µ
k + αki + xijβ
k + $kij, (14)
where ykij log real fee (treatment intensity) of claim j performed by dentist i
subject to remuneration k ∈ {S,A,E}.The vector x includes our measures of patient
types, the number of treatments carried out and the exemption status of the patient
undergoing treatment.
The regression results for each of the three forms of remuneration are reported in
Table 2.
Given that, at least within the data we consider, dentists work under only re-
muneration method the estimates reported in Table 2 represent selection-corrected
estimates.
Treatment intensity is increasing, but at a diminishing rate, with patient age until
patients are approximately 50 years old. Beyond age 50, treatment intensity falls.
The estimates suggest that the gender of the patient is unrelated to intensity. Other
controls (omitted from Table 2 for reasons of clarity) for changes in the nominal fees
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Table 2: Fixed effects regression results by contract
Principal Associate Employed
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE
page 0.0236 0.0023 0.021 0.005 0.0218 0.0058
page2 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.00006 -0.0002 0.00006
dpsex 0.017 0.023 -0.009 0.056 -0.0033 0.053
trauma 0.325 0.066 0.401 0.134 0.442 0.214
dcons 0.897 0.025 1.014 0.054 0.991 0.066
dsurg 0.519 0.03 0.524 0.064 0.344 0.075
dprosth 1.130 0.037 1.256 0.083 1.505 0.0896
dorth 1.704 0.102 1.386 0.252 (dropped)
dother 0.193 0.031 0.215 0.063 -0.143 0.08
exempt 0.248 0.025 0.163 0.056 0.087 0.06
lcldcy -0.111 0.025 -0.054 0.054 -0.081 0.038
cons 2.59 0.126 2.45 0.277 2.35 0.23
ρ 0.320 0.366 0.21
R2 0.3148 0.3209 0.3732
Observations 7299 1769 821
Note: these estim ates are for the active group on ly.
for treatment were similar across self-employed dentists (and significant for principals)
but not significant for employed dentists.
Variations in the patient types are captured by dummy variables representing
broad SDR categories. The controls for patient types are generally significant and
illustrate some differences between self-employed and employed dentists. The coef-
ficient of dsurg is 0.519 for self-employed dentists and 0.34 for employed dentists
which implies that patients who receive any surgical treatment receive 18% more
treatment from a self-employed dentist than from an employed dentist. Combining
the results of Table 1 and Table 2 implies that while self-employed dentists provide
surgical treatment less frequently than employed dentists, when they do they provide
that treatment more intensively. In contrast, employed dentists treat patients who
require any prosthetic treatment, dprosth, 38% more intensively than self-employed
principals.
Our theoretical framework requires that if the number of patients treated increases
the probability of a dentist’s time constraint binding, it should not increase treatment
intensity. Our estimates suggest that the elasticity of the intensity of treatment per
claim (with respect to the number of claims) is approximately -0.05 for associates,
-0.11 for principals and -0.08 for employed dentists. While the elasticity is significant
at the 5% level for both self-employed principals and employed dentists, the elasticity
is not significant for associates.
An exempt patient receives approximately 25% more intensive treatment than
a patient liable for the full NHS dental charge if treated by a principal and 16%
more intensive treatment if treated by an associate. Thus, ceteris paribus, we find
evidence of a distinction between principals and associates in the intensity with which
they treat exempt versus non-exempt patients. The coefficient on the exempt term
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suggests that associates and principals respond to the exemption status of the patient
in significantly different ways. Other things equal, principals are more responsive to
the exemption status of the patient than associates: relative to a non-exempt patient,
principals treat exempt patients approximately 9% more intensively than associates.
In contrast there is no significant effect of exemption status on treatment intensity
for employed dentists.
The distinct estimates for both principals versus associates and self-employed
versus employed dentists are consistent with our theoretical predictions. First, the
distinction between employed and self-employed dentists is consistent with both the
demand and time constraint binding for self employed principals and only the time
constraint binding for employed dentists. Second, the distinct and significant es-
timates for principals and associates are consistent with the time and demand con-
straint binding for both types of self-employed dentist but, given their revenue sharing
arrangements with the principal, the incentives to increase intensity are mitigated for
associates.
5 Discussion
It is commonplace for economists to predict that self-interested clinicians will deliver
treatments that are influenced by the financial rewards that they are offered. In con-
trast, physicians are inclined to claim that professional ethics operate to ensure that
it is patients’ interests alone that determine treatments. Evidence relevant to adju-
dicating between these views is difficult to acquire and interpret because, whilst it is
possible to observe different patterns of treatment that correlate with different remu-
neration structures, there are many factors that could account for such differences.
For example, patients with particular medical conditions might be drawn towards
the particular type of physician who happens to work under a particular form of
remuneration, or physicians may exhibit genuinely held differences in what consti-
tutes the patient’s best interest and may choose the form of remuneration structure
to work under accordingly. Both variations in patients’ underlying medical condi-
tions and differences in clinical opinion are arguably justifiable sources of variation in
observed treatment and disentangling the pure effect of remuneration from amongst
these confounding influences is problematic.
The data that we have had access to, and which concern the delivery of dental
treatments under the NHS in Scotland, provide a means of resolving these issues
because we can observe dentists making choices over a large number of patients, many
of whose characteristics we can observe. Hence, a fixed effects regression framework,
in which dentist specific preferences are controlled for and in which proxies for patient
types are used to control for the allocation of different types of patients to dentists
who are subject to differing remuneration methods, permits us to consider the effect
of remuneration alone on treatment decisions. In order to interpret the empirical
evidence we have contructed a model in which the impact of remuneration structure
works through the exemption status of patients. Interpreted in the context of this
model, the empirical evidence that we have presented comes down in favour of the
14
economist’s view — once the other confounding influences have been accounted for,
remuneration exerts an impact on treatment choices and does so in a way that accords
well with the economic model. Where patients can be expected to exert little influence
over their treatment because they are insulated from the cost, we expected to find
treatment being increased and that expectation is borne out by the data. In the
context of the dental treatment of patients who are exempt from charges in the NHS
we find that self-employed dentists provide 15-20% (by value) more treatment. The
more the dentist has a financial stake in the treatment offered – as is probably
the case for the owners of dental practices – the greater is the effect. Overall,
treatment intensity across all patients is approximately equal between self-employed
and employed dentists indicating that there is a significant distributional impact of
the treatment decisions that we have analysed. Non-exempt patients receive less
treatment from self-employed dentists than from employed dentists, indicating that
the overall time available to carry out more intensive treatments is limited and that
extra treatment for some is less treatment for others.
One key policy conclusion of our analysis is, therefore, that remuneration mat-
ters – it has real effects on the treatments that are delivered. Where policy makers
are concerned that treatment should reflect either the requirement of patients or the
assessments of physicians, it is important to choose the appropriate remuneration
method. Our analysis has not dealt with the obvious question of which remunera-
tion method is to be preferred because in order to answer that question we would
need much more information on the costs and benefits of dental care. Nevertheless,
equipped with evidence to support the view that the choice of remuneration method
can be influential in determining clinical outcomes, the value of acquiring that infor-
mation is clearer.
A second key policy conclusion of our analysis is that in the context of dentistry in
the NHS, self-employed dentistry is, at least for some patients, more interventionist
dentistry and an obvious concern is whether that increased intervention is justifiable
in terms of clinical outcome. Even outside of the NHS, our findings have policy
relevance in that there are concerns regarding the operation of the market for private
dentistry in the UK –OFT (2003). If imperfections in the market for private health
care result in excessive prices for treatments then our analysis indicates that those
inflated prices can feed through into greater dental intervention if, as is the case with
private insurance, individuals are insulated from the costs of the treatments they
receive.
The theoretical framework we have used in this paper does not include unverifiable
quality decisions on the part of providers. Quality of service is a key concern of policy
makers and has been the subject of attention of much of the theoretical literature
in health contracting. That literature suggests that the nature of the remuneration
arrangement may have an important part to play in influencing quality choices by
providers if there is a mechanism by which — to use our terminology — treatment
intensity feeds into the marginal revenue effect of changes in quality. Again theory
alone cannot resolve the question of whether quality will be adversely affected by a
shift towards lower (or higher) treatment intensity and this is a important issue for
future empirical research.
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Whilst our data and thus the analysis have concerned the provision of dental
services in Scotland, our methodology could be applied wherever there are suitable
data detailing the treatments delivered under a variety of remuneration methods.
This study gives some support to those who hold that financial incentives may be
important tools in influencing the outcome of health care markets.
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